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The Necessity for a "Standard"
in Federal Wage and
Hour Legislation
By STEPHEN R. McNICHOLS*
Judicial recognition of state wage and hour legislation has received
turbulent and stormy treatment in the courts.1 State legislation directed
toward wage and hour control has been held constitutional by the courts
because it is said to have direct relation to the public health and general
well-being.2 The United States Supreme Court laid violent hands on
the first federal attempt to control wages and hours by the same act in
the Schechter Corp. u. United States.3 The late Mr. Justice Cardozo,
in a concurring opinion which was indorsed by Mr. Justice Stone, char-
acterized the delegation of authority in the Schechter case as "delegation
running riot.' ' 4 He further declared that the "wages and hours of labor
are essential features of the plan, its very bone and sinew."-5  Chief
Justice Hughes dealt the NIRA a final crushing blow when he stated
that the Industrial Recovery Act supplied no standard for administra-
tive rule making, but instead prescribed the making of codes, which codes
themselves provided for the making of standards. This the Chief Jus-
tice described as a legislative function 6
In the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Hughes said:
"We have repeatedly recognized the necessity of adapting
legislation to complex conditions involving a host of details with
which the national legislature cannot deal directly. We pointed
out in the Panama Company Case that the Constitution has never
been regarded as denying practicality, which will enable it to per-
form its function in laying down policies and establishing standards,
while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordi-
nate rule within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to
which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply. But
we said that the constant recognition of the necessity and validity
*Of Denver. Member of District of Columbia and Colorado Bars.
'Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 416 (1908) ; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45
(1904); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (1917); Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
261 U. S. 525 (1922): West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1936) ;
Associated Industries of Okla. v. Ind. Welfare Comm'n, 90 Pa. (2nd) 899 (1939)
(the court in this case held the statute met constitutional tests, but was unconstitutional
on other grounds.)
'West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, supra, note (1), page 393.






of such provisions, and the wide range of administrative authority
which has been developed by means of them, cannot be allowed
to obscure the limitation of the authority to delegate, if our con-
stitutional system is to be maintained." Pp. 529-530.
It is to be remembered that the states have reserved to themselves
a police power, and it is upon this jurisdiction that they have based the
control of wage and hour legislation. The federal government having
no such power has invoked its jurisdiction over interstate commerce as
a jurisdiction upon which to predicate the control of wages and hours.
In the Schechter case, supra, Congress attempted to delegate to the Presi-
dent an authority to regulate industry which was purely intrastate,
thereby obscuring "the limitation of the authority to delegate," and
thus the NIRA fell into the unconstitutional category.
In certain types of legislation the necessity of providing a standard
is absolutely imperative. In some instances the standard is almost cap-
able of definition; in other types any attempt at definition would result
in violation of due-process concepts. The Court has said that in cases
where the delegation is broad it is enough to declare the policy of the legis-
lature, require the administrative order to be bolstered by findings of
fact, provide for a fair hearing, and a review by a judicial tribunal.
7
Where the matter to be delegated requires broad discretionary pow-
ers and the subject matter is complex or varying with circumstances, the
Court has said that a wide latitude to "fill in the details" may be dele-
gated. 8
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 underwent the most bitter
and hard-fought struggle to enactment of all the New Deal legislation.
The focal point of the struggle centered around the issue of setting a
standard.9 Ardent proponents of the bill, anxious to see the bill emerge
from congressional debate and the silent intrigues of committee systems,
fought rigidity in setting a standard; while opposition forces, appre-
hensive since the Schechter case, supra, of an unconstitutional delegation
'1 nterstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88;
Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194; United States v. Baltimore Y Ohio R. Co.,
293 U. S. 454. "The authority conferred has direct relation to the standards pre-
scribed for service of common carriers and can be exercised only upon findings, based on
evidence, with respect to particular conditions of transportation."
"'But when Congress has legislated and indicated its will, it could give to those
who were to act under such general provisions 'power to fill in the details' by estab-
lishment of administrative rules and regulations, the violation of which could be pun-
ished by fine or imprisonment fixed by Congress . . ." United States v. Grimaud,
220 U. S. 506,31 Sup. Ct. 48 (1911).
"Not only were personal, economic and social viewpoints involved but difficult
constitutional issues were encountered. Those in favor of flexible standards pointed out
that rigid standards would run into serious due-process problems. Those favoring
rigid standards contended the flexible standard involved unconstitutional delegation of
powers." Forsythe, Legislative History of Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 Law &4 Con.
Prob. 478.
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of power, fought the flexible standard.10  The present act is a studious
attempt to innoculate the lifeless "bone and sinew" of the Blue Eagle
with constitutional serum. The tentative draft, led an oscillatory
carrier to enactment during its course through the House and Senate
due to the American Federation of Labor and the CIO pressure forces,
as well as by the maze of legislative objections due to the prevailing
standard of living in the different sections of the country."
The act provides that one hundred and twenty days after the
enactment every employer subject to the provisions of the act shall be
required to pay his employees a twenty-five cent an hour minimum
wage during the first year and not less than thirty cents an hour there-
after for the next six years, not less than forty cents an hour every
year thereafter. Variations of the forty-cent rate may be made by the
Administrator with the aid of the industry committees. At ino time
may the minimum be lower than thirty cents after the first year. Sec-
tion 6 (a) further provides that the Administrator, with the assist-
ance of the industry committee, may, at any time after the effective date
of the act, establish a minimum wage scale for any industry covered by
the act, which shall not exceed forty cents an hour. Thus the Admin-
istrator, four months after the effective date of the act, may require an
employer to pay his employees a forty cent an hour wage.'
2
The hour provisions under Section 7 (a) provide that no employer
subject to the act shall employ his employees for a work-week longer
than forty-four hours for the first year after the effective date of the
act; for longer than forty-two hours during the second year from such
date; and for longer than forty hours thereafter.
With the foregoing standards set up providing for a floor for wages
and a ceiling for hours, leaving the administrative "details" to be "filled
in" by the Administrator and the industry committees, it would seem
from the due-process standpoint and the delegation angle the problem
has been met. In the event the Administrator with the aid of the indus-
try.committees does issue a contested order, any person aggrieved thereby
may appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals. 13
Over a period of years there has been considerable discussion and
writing on the advisability and necessity for requiring Congress to estab-
""The problem was much more basic than merely a disagreement over flexible or
inflexible standards. In the final analysis the argument was one involving different
theories of political science. Those in favor of the flexible standards believed that the
legislation could be best handled by an administrative body of experts who could devote
their whole time to the problem. They argued that Congress did not have the time
or facilities to intelligently cope with the situation. On the other band the persons
favoring rigid standards argued that Congress could, and should, set standards which
would be fair to all concerned. The same problem is at the heart of all government





lish a standard in matters of public interest where the regulation and
control is complex and fluctuating with circumstances. This becomes
even more conjectural when we consider the wide degree of control dele-
gated to the Interstate Commerce Commission, 14 Federal Radio Com-
mission,15 and the Customs Commission. 16 One noted author points
out that liberal delegative authority is usually found in safety and health
regulations, or in other words, "where there are no controversial issues
of policy or of opinion."' 1 7 The same author states that:
"Even here, direct statutory regulation may be preferred, if
the subject matter touches class interests or otherwise has a strong
public appeal . . . Practically equivalent to the absence of contro-
verted issues is their obscurity or non-recognition or non-formula-
tion in the public mind or in the minds of the parties affected.
This applies particularly to economic regulation. It would be
almost inconceivable that the fixing of hours of adult female labor
should be !eft to administrative regulation, in view of the sharp
conflict of interests and of opinion. On the other hand, the factors
of rate regulation are so obscure that delegation suggests itself as
an acceptable solution, even where regulation assumes a distinctly
legislative character . . . it cannot be regarded as other than an
anomaly that Congress should have left it to the Interstate Com-
merce Commission to determine for future percentage rate of fair
return, tempered though the delegation was by the initial fixing of
the rate by Congress itself, thus setting a standard for the guidance
of the Commission."' 8
The author continued to point out that with the expansion of utilities
regulation and railroad control it may become preferable to liberally
delegate complex problems rather than indulge in the "perils of section-
ally influenced legislative intervention."' 19 This continued expansion
will no doubt obviate the impending fears of delegative unc6nstitution-
ality. In view of the fact that any rigid formulization of wage scales
would be unsatisfactory due to the maze of sectional factors entering
into the field, it seems inescapable that the Wage and Hour Adminis-
trator with the aid of an expert body of industry committees which are
comparably as efficient as the Interstate Commerce Commission experts,
should be capable of conducting an equally efficient wage and hour
administration.
"Supra, note 7.
'Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U. S. 266 (1922).
"Hampton &Co. v. U. S., 276 U. S. 394 (1927).
"7Freund, Administrative Powers Over Persons and Property, 1928, p. 218. Then
see, Goodnow, Principles of Administrative Law in the United States. (1905), 324, et
seq.; Cheadle, The Delegation of Legislative Functions, 27 Yale Law Jor., 898.
'Id. Freund at 219.
"Id. Freund at 219.
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There seem to be but two exceptions outlined by the Supreme Court
to the "delegata potestas non potest delegari" rule: (1) when the Con-
gress is legislating in a very complex matter in which it outlines its
policy and sets out a standard for the commission or executive to follow
and allows the executive or commission to "fill in the details;" and, (2)
where the Congress enacts the law and includes the details merely dele-
gating the time the law shall go into effect according to circumstantial
need at the discretion of the commission or executive. There has appar-
ently never been any clear cut definition or requisite rule whereby such
policies or standards are known to be adequate, thus supplying assurance
that the delegation will be valid.20  One author has pointed out an
exception to the general rule against delegation of legislative power that
has gone unchallenged by the courts despite the constitutional prohibi-
tion based upon the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers.
State legislatures have universally delegated complete and autonomous
powers to municipalities without fixing standards or declaring policies,
when the constitutions of the respective states clearly proclaim that
legislative powers shall be vested in the general assemblies. 21  This is
clearly a delegation of legislative power contrary to established consti-
tutional principles. The rate making cases22 formerly referred to show
clearly how liberal administrative regulation of industry affected with
public interest, coupled with the added factor of convenience, is desir-
able and entirely practical. Judge Brewer, very early, in Chicago 3
N. W. R. Co. v. Dey, stated:
"There is no inherent vice in such delegation of power; noth-
ing in the nature of things which would prevent the state, by
constitutional enactment at least, from intrusting these powers to
such a board; and nothing in such constitutional action which
would invade any rights guaranteed by the federal constitution
• . . the reasonableness of a rate change with the changed condi-
tions of circumstance. That which would be fair and reasonable
today, six months or a year hence may be too high or too low
"23
Such may well turn out to be the case in the administration of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. What is fair and adequate in regard to wages
and hours may change with the circumstances-political, economic and
general living conditions. The necessity of providing a standard, other
than a specific declaration of policy, might likely prove to be of little
value, and might even prove to be a handicap in providing effective
'Ray and Wienke, Uncharted Seas of Delegated Power, 29 Ill. L. R. 1027, 1028.
'Foster, Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Officers, 7 IMi. L. R..
398.
"See note (7), supra.
'35 Fed. 866 (1888).
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administration in view of the declared policy to . . "correct and as
rapidly as practicable to eliminate the conditions above referred to in such
industries without substantially curtailing employment or earning
power," these conditions referred to by Congress having been said to
be, labor conditions "detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum
standard of living necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being
of workers. ' 24  It is conceivable that a basic floor for wages and a
ceiling for hours might be Procrustean in the most objectionable sense.
An economic slump might drive some of the industries out of existence.
If administrative discretion could be exercised upon a finding of fact
that such circumstances did exist, an administrative order might pre-
serve the industries through a critical period. True, the Administrator
does have the power to fluctuate the wage and hour scale between the
statutory limits, but this may at times prove inapplicable.
The Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan25 added little or nothing to the
former decisions on the question of providing a standard: but did
serve the purpose of showing the needlessness of requiring a standard
in certain cases. In that case the President was authorized to limit and
prohibit the transportation in interstate commerce of petroleum prod-
ucts in excess of limitations prescribed by the authorities, whether it be
by a board, commission or an executive order. This was declared void
because the Court said that Congress could not delegate its legislative
power without reference to a standard. And secondly that the admin-
istrative order or executive order must contain a factual statement to
justify the order. Again in this case there is no standard specifically
set out, nor is there need for one. The President either prohibits or
allows the transportation of petroleum products in interstate commerce.
If he finds the oil is "hot" he prohibits it; if not, he does not interfere.
Mr. Justice Cardozo found a standard implied in the act. And it is
pointed out that specific phrases in the act do not constitute a standard
taken separately, and they are self-contradictory if taken literally to-
gether.
26
In Mahler v. Eby2 7 the Court held an alien ruling invalid merely
because the Secretary of Labor in rejecting aliens according to the statute
did not add the surplusage that the aliens were "undesirable." The
Court declared that such a determination of fact is a prerequisite to
deportation, and that by not including the finding of fact the statute
was not complied with.
'Section 2 (a) and 2 (b). See also Herman, The Administration and Enforce-
ment of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 Law V Con. Prob. 368.
'55 Sup. Ct. 241 (1935).t Cousens, Delegation of Legislative Power, 33 Mich. L. R. 539, 540, 541, 542.
*r264 U. S. 32 (1934).
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The effect of the Mahler v. Eby case and the Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan28 decisions is to require a standard which is not real and useful,
but merely formal-better stated:
"A standard must be imposed by legislation delegating regu-
latory power, but how real must the standard be? If the United
States v. Chemical Foundation9 is to be followed it will not extend
further than to require the addition of a few vague words to federal
statutes and presidential proclamations . . . A standard must
be set, but previous cases teach how vague such a standard may be
and there is certainly nothing here irreconcilable with those cases.
The court has indeed set a limit but it is formal rather than sub-
stantial and the slightest care in drafting will avoid infringing it."30
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in a recent decisions' presents
an enlightened view of wage control by an administrative body. Al-
though the Oklahoma law3 2 was held to be unconstitutional because the
Oklahoma State Constitution provided that every act of the legislature
may only embrace one subject, which subject shall be expressed clearly
in the title,33 the statute met constitutional tests in regard to delegation
of powers to the Industrial Commission. It is interesting to note that
the legislature granted very broad powers to the Industrial Commission.
The Commission, after investigation, was given the power to establish
wages to be paid to workers in any industry or trade, with the exception
of those specifically excluded.3 4 This decision is indicative of a clean break
from the atrophied fetters of the police power theory as a basis for wage
and hour control: economic considerations are equally weighty. The
Oklahoma Court, discussing one of its formerly adjudicated cases,3 5
confirmed that generally the legislative powers cannot be delegated, but
there are certain well defined exceptions to this rule.
.. . the Legislature is authorized to outline by general law
the general scope and purpose of the laws and delegate to an admin-
istrative commisison the power to promulgate administrative rules
and regulations. These rules may be and are in many instances
legislative in character. . . . The United States Supreme Court
and inferior federal courts have at all times recognized that while
55 Sup. Ct. 241 (1935).
272 U. S. 1 (1926). (Note-This case held that a public sale under the
Trading with the Enemy Act (40 Stat. 459 at 460) was valid because the president
authorized the sale of enemy properties according to vague and broad general standards
set out in the act.)
"Id., note 26, at 543, 544.
'Associated Industries v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 90 P. (2nd) 899 (1939).
"Oklahoma Laws, 1936-1937, c. 52.
'See section 57, article 5.
"Section 3 and 5..Sterling Refining Co. et at. v. Walker et a., 165 Okla. 45, 25 P. (2nd) 312.
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it is contrary to the Federal Constitution to delegate legislative
powers, strictly speaking, yet when the legislative power sought to
be delegated is in defined limits and for the purpose of accom-
plishing the proper administration of the law, the general effect of
which has been stated in appropriate legislative provisions, the dele-
gation is not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution." p.
904.
After citing numerous cases and authorities the Oklahoma Court states:
"From the foregoing authorities it is apparent that the power
to determine the policy of the law is primarily legislative, and can-
not be delegated whereas the power to make rules of a subordinate
character in order to carry out that policy and apply it to varying
conditions although partaking of a legislative character, is in its
dominant aspect administrative and can be delegated." _p. 904.
The Oklahoma legislature did not prescribe any specific standards
for wages in this case. It did not set a minimum wage, but merely out-
lined its policy and left the wage standard to be set by the Commission.
"The employment of wage earners at inadequate wages or
under conditions of labor detrimental to health is by the terms
of the act made unlawful. The administrative board is empowered
to determine upon investigation what are adequate minimum wages
and wholesome conditions of employment and to promulgate rules
for the creation and maintenance of such wages and conditions.
These are essential characteristics of the Washington, Oregon and
Minnesota acts upheld in the cases cited, supra. We are impressed
by the reasoning in those cases. A different conclusion could not
be announced in this case except upon consideration of an unsound
distinction or an unnatural interpretation of the act." p. 906.
Who knows-better than the body of experts in the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, Federal Radio Commission, Federal Trade Commis-
sion, or the Administrator with the aid of expert industry committees,
what standards are fair and necessary? Certainly not the courts which
have neither the time nor the facilities for making such a study. The
Fair Labor Standards Act 6 provides for an appeal to the Circuit Court
of Appeals. With the guarantee against an arbitrary or unreasonable
order from the Administrator, it is difficult to see why a rigid standard
should be necessary in this type of administration.
If setting a standard means a specific declaration of policy, there
can certainly be no quarrel with that: but on the other hand, if setting a
standard means a detailed wage standard, one that of necessity must pre-
"8Section 10.
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scribe a limit beyond which the commission has no province, and those
limits confine and hamper the proper administration of the declared pol-
icy, then we are defeating the very policy of the act by useless constric-
tions. 3 7 Fixing wage and hour standards is one of those functions which
can best be determined by an expert body. When Congress attempts to
do the rule making by setting up confining limits which cannot expand
and contract adequately to the needs, the advantages as well as the very
function of administrative law are not being utilized. Professor Cheadle
brought this point home with great force:
"The administrative field includes all acts legislative in nature
beyond the adoption of the broad policy, so that in this sense the
legislature too performs essentially administrative functions when
it works out details in the application of the policy.
"Thus, the legislative power, while concerning itself with new
rules for the future, has as its true and proper subject-matter the
broad policy which it declares. All details in the application of the
policy may be delegated, though these details may involve the exer-
cise of discretion and a choice between policies subordinate to the
broad policy of the legislature. Therefore, if Article I, section I
stood alone as an expression of the duty of Congress, that body
need only indicate the policy to be pursued, and it will have exer-
cised the power conferred upon it. The further legislative acts of
laying down in detail the rule to be followed might well be done
by Congress, or at its option, delegated to any person or body whose
possible activities are not expressly or impliedly circumscribed by
the Constitution. For instance, these legislative functions and
duties could not be conferred upon the courts provided for in the
Constitution, but they might well be conferred upon some part of
the executive branch because historically the executive has always
had some legislative duties to perform and the Constitution puts
upon him the duty of participating in certain legislative matters.
The executive is more interested than any other branch of the
government in the form, the machinery and the details of the law,
because these matters have a bearing upon its practical and efficient
execution. Especially may the legislative power be vested in other
functionaries or boards anomalous in character, brought into being
to give expertness and length to the legislative arm in the applica-
tion of its policies through detailed rules. Such bodies would not
be prohibited from exercising their duties and functions through
any implied inhibition growing out of the doctrine of the separa-
tion of powers. This construction is strengthened by consideration
of the provisions of Article I, section 8, paragraph 18 of the Con-
'Cheadle, supra, 27 Yale L. Jor., 897.
DICTA 125
stitution and the construction placed thereon by the Supreme Court
of the United States. That paragraph provides:
" 'The Congress shall have the power . . . to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers.'
"Thorough investigations by Congress through its commit-
tees, and the working out of minute details of laws are adminis-
trative functions which Congress has heretofore largely assumed,-
and not improperly so long as it can effectively handle them. But
Congress can as properly delegate these functions, retaining to itself
only the control and direction of policies. In fact this becomes
the duty of Congress whenever it finds that these functions can be
more efficiently performed by some other person or body. In such
case under the provisions of Article I, section 8, paragraph 18, it
becomes the duty of Congress to delegate the making of detailed
rules to an expert board or to an individual having the necessary
skill and information. In doing this Congress is 'making laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into effect the fore-
going powers.' And this is the true point of connection between
'necessity' and the power to delegate legislative functions.
... Congress may not delegate the choosing of policies nor
the duty of formally enacting the policy into law, but it may
formulate that policy as broadly and with as much or as little detail
as it sees proper and it may deleaate the duty of working out the
details and the application of the policy to the situation it was
intended to meet. The rule, tberefore,-so far as there may be
said to be a rule against the delegation of legislative powers-is not
a prohibition against delegations of legislative functions or of the
duty to do acts legislative in their nature after Congress has laid
down the broad rule; but it is a prohibition of the attempted sub-
delegation of the very power itself or the duty of meeting in annual
session and declaring the national will in some form of enactment
in the general laws. As to when the necessity for delegation exists,
the decision rests with the legislative body-a discretion not to be
disturbed by the courts except in clear cases of abuse. The very
fact of the separation of powers should make courts more careful
in this respect." 38
In applying these thoughts to the administration of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, one is presented with a vexing question. There seems
to be no necessity for prescribing wage and hour limits which are to be
determined in any case by a finding of fact; i.e., by making a survey of
living conditions, industrial conditions, prices, markets, and in general
by securing a composite cross-section of the factors entering into the
problem, and then setting a wage and hour standard accordingly.
81d., 899, 900, 901. (Italics supplied.)
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If we come to the conclusion that the courts require a standard,
that is, merely a formal standard, without reference to its usefulness
and pragmatic 'results, then we are surely becoming arithmetic in our
application of administrative law, the very essence of which is discretion
delegated because of convenience and necessity due to complexity.
DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEY BY ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD
(The Steady Reach for Power)
A recent amendment of the rules of practice of the Federal Trade
Commission deserves attention by the bar. On December 22, 1939, a
new paragraph of Rule XIII was promulgated dealing with the power
of a trial examiner with relation to the conduct of counsel. The trial
examiner is directed to note on the record any disregard by counsel of
his rulings and, where he deems it necessary, to make special written
report thereof to the Commission. "In the event that counsel for the
Commission or for any respondent shall be guilty of disrespectful, dis-
orderly, or contumacious language or conduct in connection with any
hearing, the Trial Examiner may suspend the proceeding and submit
to the Commission his report thereon, together with his recommenda-
tions as to whether any rule should be issued to show cause why such
counsel should not be suspended or disbarred pursuant to Rule IV or
subjected to other appropriate action in respect thereto." The new
Rule further provides that a copy of the trial examiner's report shall be
furnished to counsel and that the Commission will take disciplinary
action only after an opportunity for hearing has been given to such
counsel.
The adoption of this Rule raises the question whether a trial ex-
aminer or a member of the Commission should possess the power to
discipline members of the bar. Under the Federal Trade Commission
Act neither the members of the Commission nor the trial examiners are
required to be members of the bar, nor are they in any sense of the word
to- be regarded as judges. While no one should condone an attorney's
language or conduct which is disorderly, it is open to serious question
whether any layman, or, for that matter, any fellow-member of the
bar should be empowered to discipline an attorney for language which
the former considers "disrespectful." An attorney is often required to
defend the rights of his client with vigor. Such vigor may easily be
deemed disrespectful by a prejudiced trial examiner or commissioner.
Reference may be made in this connection to the recent opinion of the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the case of Inland
Steel Company v. National Labor Relations Board, where the conduct
of the trial examiner was found to compare most unfavorably with the
conduct of counsel.
(Lawyer Service Letter, N. Y. State Bar Assn., Jan. 31, 1940.)
